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Uberto and Wilner: SB 336 - Law Enforcement Officers and Agencies

LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND AGENCIES
Georgia Bureau of Investigation: Amend Chapter 3 of Title 35 of
the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, Relating to the Georgia
Bureau of Investigation, so as to Prevent the Disclosure of a
Subpoena Issued for Production of Electronic Communication
Service Records for Computer or Electronic Devices that Are Used
in Furtherance of Certain Offenses against Minors or Involving
Trafficking of Persons for Labor or Sexual Servitude, to the
Subscriber or Customer; Allow the Georgia Crime Information
Center to Retain Fingerprints of Certain Individuals under Certain
Circumstances and Submit such Fingerprints to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation; Provide for an Exchange of Information
to Certain Entities; Provide for Removal of Fingerprints under
Certain Circumstances; Provide for Fees; Amend Titles 20, 31, 37,
and 49 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, Relating to
Education, Health, Mental Health, and Social Services,
Respectively, so as to Allow the Georgia Bureau of Investigation
and, as Authorized, the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Retain
Fingerprints when an Agency or Entity Is Participating in the
Bureau’s Program; Provide for Related Matters; Repeal
Conflicting Laws; And for Other Purposes
CODE SECTIONS:

BILL NUMBER:
ACT NUMBER:
GEORGIA LAWS:
SUMMARY:

O.C.G.A. §§ 20-1A-31, -32, -34, -38, 39 (amended); 31-2-9 (amended); 312A-7 (amended); 31-7-254 (amended);
31-7-258
(amended);
31-7-259
(amended); 35-3-4.1 (amended); 35-34.3 (amended); 35-3-33 (amended); 371-28 (amended); 49-2-14.1 (amended);
49-2-14
(amended);
49-5-62–64
(amended); 49-5-63, -64, -68–69.1
(amended); 49-5-111 (amended)
SB 336
411
2018 Ga. Laws 507
The Act prohibits data carriers from
disclosing to their customers the
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existence of a subpoena issued for the
production of the customers’ records.
The Act also allows the Georgia
Bureau of Investigation to retain the
fingerprints of individuals working in
certain professions that require
background checks for the duration of
employment.
July 1, 2018; O.C.G.A. § 20-1A-39,
January 1, 2019

History
Georgia Senate Bill (SB) 336 consists of two distinct legislative
efforts. The original SB 336 prohibits data carriers from informing
their customers of the existence of subpoenas seeking to obtain
customers’ records. Georgia House of Representatives Bill (HB) 623,
which was added to SB 336 by substitute, allows the Georgia Bureau
of Investigation (GBI) to retain fingerprints collected during
occupational licensing background checks in limited circumstances.
This Peach Sheet evaluates each of these two sections separately.
HB 623
In 2012, Christina Hawkins assumed ownership of the Progressive
Christian Academy in Macon, Georgia.1 Although Hawkins
underwent a background check when she assumed ownership,
officials later discovered that she had prior convictions for fraud,
theft, possession of drug paraphernalia, and additional crimes.2 How
could her numerous convictions have gone unnoticed? A state
background check that Hawkins passed in Georgia failed to detect
those prior convictions because they occurred in Florida.3
1. Michael Klazema, Georgia Now Requires National Background Checks for Child Care Workers,
(May 3, 2013), https://www.backgroundchecks.com/community/post=3984
[https://perma.cc/E27X-3MUY].
2. Allie Kuester, Woman Who Inspired Georgia Educator Background Check Law Arrested in
Florida, MIND YOUR BUSINESS, INC. (Sept. 5, 2014), https://www.mybinc.com/blog/woman-inspiredgeorgia-educator-background-check-law-arrested-florida/ [https://perma.cc/C55Y-QX7L].
3. Klazema, supra note 1.
BACKGROUNDCHECKS.COM
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Additionally, her convictions were under an alias, “Christina
Perera.”4 In response to stories like this, the Georgia legislature
passed a law requiring all childcare workers to pass national
fingerprinting background checks.5 Although these extensive
fingerprinting background checks cost more than the comparatively
limited state background checks, the bill’s sponsor urged, “[i]t’s all
about the safety of the children.”6
Georgia law requires fingerprint background checks for various
occupations involving work with children, patients, or the elderly.7
The Georgia Department of Early Care and Learning (DECAL), the
Georgia Department of Human Services (DHS), the Georgia
Department of Community Health (DCH), and the Georgia
Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities
(DBHDD) each require fingerprint background checks.8 However,
felons can still end up working in facilities caring for the most
vulnerable of our population even with federal background check
requirements. For example, Georgia law required childcare
institutions under the DHS to administer fingerprint background
checks every five years.9 Thus, an employee working in such a
facility could be convicted of a felony after the background check
and continue to work there undetected until the next required
background check. However, as a practical matter, continual
fingerprint checks impose additional costs on employers and
inconvenience for employees undergoing the background checks.
To address the need for real-time protection of Georgia’s children
and elderly, HB 623—as it appears in SB 336—authorizes the GBI
and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to retain fingerprints
submitted for these national background checks.10 Thus, Georgia
4. Id.
5. Nancy Badertscher, Deeper Checks on Child-Care Workers Coming, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Dec.
8, 2013, 10:25 PM), https://www.myajc.com/news/state—regional/deeper-checks-child-care-workerscoming/uZGFXgM99rTyYZAmEHn9EK/ [https://perma.cc/SL9W-JUP5].
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. §§ 20-1A-31, 31-2-9 (2018).
8. O.C.G.A. §§ 20-1A-39, 49-2-14, 31-2-9, 37-1-28 (2018).
9. Video Recordings of Non-Civil Judiciary Committee Meeting at 38 min., 6 sec. (Mar. 12, 2018)
(remarks by Rep. Andrew Welch (R-110th)), https://livestream.com/accounts/19771755/events/
7993559/videos/171466762 [https://perma.cc/ULW2-HMZG] [hereinafter Non-Civil Judiciary Video].
10. See id. at 48 min., 59 sec. (remarks by Rep. Ed Setzler (R-35th)); see also HB 623 (HCS), 2018
Ga. Gen. Assemb.
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officials could be notified instantly if a childcare worker has been
charged with a felony anywhere in the United States.11 Additionally,
retention of fingerprint data could obviate the need for continual
retesting.
The Underlying SB 336
In September 2009, the GBI’s Internet Crimes Against Children
Task Force detected an IP address from Rome, Georgia, sharing
suspected child pornography.12 A GBI agent subsequently obtained a
subpoena from Comcast, the Internet provider for the IP address.13 In
response to the subpoena, Comcast revealed that the IP address
belonged to Charles Ralph Henderson.14 The GBI then obtained a
search warrant and confiscated Henderson’s computer.15 The
evidence stored on the computer led to Henderson’s conviction on
four counts of sexual exploitation of children.16
Subpoenas directed to Internet providers, like Comcast, have led to
numerous charges of child pornography and other computer crimes.17
Internet providers receiving subpoenas are often urged not to notify
their customers who are being targeted by law enforcement.18
Otherwise, customers aware of pending criminal investigations
against them might delete the evidence necessary to sustain a
conviction.19 In one copyright infringement case, for instance,
Comcast informed its customer of the lawsuit against him and
warned the customer that Comcast intended to reveal his identity in
response to a subpoena.20 The customer subsequently wiped his hard
11. See Non-Civil Judiciary Video, supra note 9, at 49 min., 9 sec. (remarks by Rep. Ed Setzler
(R-35th)).
12. Henderson v. State, 320 Ga. App. 553, 554, 740 S.E.2d 280, 284 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013).
13. Id., 740 S.E.2d at 284.
14. Id., 740 S.E.2d at 284.
15. Id., 740 S.E.2d at 284.
16. Id., 740 S.E.2d at 284.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Ortega, No. CR415-134, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147638 at *2 (S.D.
Ga. 2015); Courtney v. State, 340 Ga. App. 496, 496, 797 S.E.2d 496, 496 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017).
18. Michael Levenson, Power to Seize Phone, Net Records Is a ‘Sanctioned Fishing Expedition,’
Critics Say, BOS. GLOBE (July 16, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/07/16/concernsraised-over-prosecutors-power-seize-phone-internet-records/JKdVWqjFNUSMkaboOoAhZK/story.html
[https://perma.cc/LWH8-Z26D].
19. Id.
20. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Davis, No. 05-0316, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50955, at *4–5 (E.D.
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drive clean before forensic examiners could confiscate it.21 Although
the language in such subpoenas requests that Internet providers
refrain from notifying users of the subpoena, some Internet providers
will always warn subscribers unless they are legally compelled to
keep quiet.22
In response, legislators have sought to prevent Internet providers
from warning subscribers of the existence of a subpoena against
them. For example, the federally proposed Targeting Child Predators
Act would amend 18 U.S.C. § 3486 to require Internet providers to
wait 180 days before notifying subscribers of subpoenas requesting
their personal information for child exploitation investigations.23
Other states have prohibited Internet providers from notifying
customers of subpoenas against them, regardless of the type of
investigation,24 and SB 336 contains the same prohibitions.
Bill Tracking
Consideration and Passage by the Senate
Senators Renee Unterman (R-45th), Butch Miller (R-49th), Gloria
Butler (D-55th), and Joshua McKoon (R-29th) sponsored SB 336 in
the Georgia Senate.25 The bill was read for the first time in the Senate
on January 22, 2018, and was committed to the Senate Committee on
Pa. July 26, 2006).
21. Id. at *8.
22. Aaron Sankin, Meet Sonic, the Anti-Comcast, DAILY DOT (Apr. 7, 2015, 9:07 AM),
https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/sonic-isp-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/XZH5-3QBW].
23. House Committee Passes DeSantis Bill Targeting Child Predators, STATES NEWS SERVICE
(Mar. 22, 2017), https://desantis.house.gov/2017/3/house-committee-passes-desantis-bill-targetingchild-predators (on file with the Georgia State University Law Review).
24. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3016 (2018) (allowing an agency to apply for a court
order directing Internet provider “not to notify any other person of the existence of the subpoena, court
order or warrant for such period as the court deems appropriate”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.24 (West
2018) (requiring Internet provider in certain circumstances to create backup copy of communications
“[w]ithout notifying the subscriber”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-17b (2018) (allowing court to
prohibit disclosure of subpoena for up to ninety days in certain circumstances); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 8103 (West 2018) (permitting delay of up to ninety days of required customer notification in
“emergency” circumstances); W. VA. CODE § 62-1G-2(e) (2018) (“The electronic communications
system or service . . . shall not disclose the existence of the subpoena or its response to the subpoena to
the account holder identified in the subpoena.”).
25. Georgia General Assembly, SB 336, Bill Tracking, http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/enUS/display/20172018/SB/336 [https://perma.cc/F6FH-XF78] [hereinafter SB 336 Bill Tracking].
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Judiciary.26 On February 8, 2018, the Committee amended the bill in
part and favorably reported it by Committee substitute.27
The Committee substitute included most of the introduced bill’s
text, but a few subsections were slightly changed.28 The Committee
updated the title to reflect the bill’s purpose more directly without
making any material change to its content.29 Further, the Committee
also changed the text of two subsections to include internal
references in the proposed statutory text. For example, Section 2—
which sought to amend Code section 35-3-4.3(b)—now reads “the
subpoena issued pursuant to subsection (a) of this Code section,”30
instead of simply stating “the subpoena for production.”31 The
Committee made no substantive changes.32
The Senate read the bill for the second time on February 12, 2018,
and for the third time on February 28, 2018.33 No floor amendments
were offered. The Senate passed the Committee substitute as
amended on February 28, 2018, by a unanimous vote of 50 to 0.34
Consideration and Passage by the House
Representative Andrew Welch (R-110th) sponsored SB 336 in the
Georgia House of Representatives.35 The House read the bill for the
first time on March 1, 2018, and committed it to the House Judiciary
Non-Civil Committee.36 The bill was read in the House for the
second time on March 5, 2018.37 On March 12, 2018, the Judiciary

26. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 336, Jan. 22, 2018.
27. Id.
28. Compare SB 336, as introduced, 2018 Ga. Gen. Assemb., with SB 336 (SCS), 2018 Ga. Gen.
Assemb.
29. Compare SB 336 (SCS), Title, p. 1, ll. 1–7, 2018 Ga. Gen. Assemb., with SB 336, as introduced,
Title, p. 1, ll. 1–7, 2018 Ga. Gen. Assemb.
30. SB 336 (SCS), § 2, p. 2, l. 56, 2018 Ga. Gen. Assemb.
31. SB 336, as introduced, § 2, p. 2, l. 49, 2018 Ga. Gen. Assemb.
32. Compare SB 336, as introduced, 2018 Ga. Gen. Assemb., with SB 336 (SCS), 2018 Ga. Gen.
Assemb.
33. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 336, Feb. 28, 2018.
34. Id.; Georgia Senate Voting Record, SB 336, Vote #533 (Feb. 28, 2018).
35. SB 336 Bill Tracking, supra note 25.
36. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 336, Mar. 1, 2018.
37. Id.
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Non-Civil Committee amended the bill in part and favorably reported
the bill by substitute.38
The Committee added HB 623, then pending in the House, to SB
336 by substitute, making significant changes to the length and
substance of SB 336. Specifically, these changes took SB 336’s two
former sections and added twenty-two subsections and a completely
revised third section.39 These changes were all directed at allowing
the Georgia Crime Information Center to retain fingerprints of
individuals who were going through background checks for an
employer or agency that participated in the GBI’s fingerprinting
program, which was the content of HB 623.40 The Committee
changed the title of SB 336 to reflect these substantive changes.41
The Committee’s proposed change to SB 336 required updating
several sections of Georgia’s Code. Section 1A-1 added a paragraph,
(a)(1)(F) to Code section 35-3-33, which would allow the Georgia
Crime Information Center to “[o]btain and file fingerprints,
descriptions, photographs, and any other pertinent identifying data on
persons who”42 may be fingerprinted for background checks under
Georgia or federal law.43 Such fingerprints are to be kept “separately
from records relating to the identification of criminals.”44

38. Id.
39. Compare SB 336, as passed Senate, 2018 Ga. Gen. Assemb., with SB 336 (HCS), 2018 Ga. Gen.
Assemb.
40. SB 336 (HCS), Title, p. 1, ll. 5–14, 2018 Ga. Gen. Assemb. (amended to now read that SB 336
will “allow the Georgia Crime Information Center to retain fingerprints of certain individuals under
certain circumstances”); see Non-Civil Judiciary Video, supra note 9; id. at 47 min., 30 sec. (remarks by
Rep. Ed Setzler (R-35th)); see also HB 623 (HCS) 2017 Ga. Gen. Assemb.
41. SB 336 (HCS), Title, p. 1, ll. 5–14, 2018 Ga. Gen. Assemb. The Committee’s version of the title
read that SB 336 was intended to do the following:
[T]o allow the Georgia Crime Information Center to retain fingerprints of certain individuals
under certain circumstances and submit such fingerprints to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; to provide for an exchange of information to certain entities; to provide for
removal of fingerprints under certain circumstances; to provide for fees; to amend Titles 20,
31, 37, and 49 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to education, health,
mental health, and social services, respectively, so as to allow the Georgia Bureau of
Investigation and, as authorized, the Federal Bureau of Investigation to retain fingerprints
when an agency or entity is participating in the bureau’s program.
Id.
42. O.C.G.A. § 35-3-33 (2018).
43. SB 336 (HCS), § 1A-1, p. 3, ll. 68–80, 2018 Ga. Gen. Assemb. (making a change to the law that
exempts fingerprints submitted to obtain or renew a weapons carry license).
44. Id. § 1A-1, p. 3, ll. 77–78.
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The Committee’s new Section 1A-2 further amended Code section
35-3-33 to allow the fingerprints obtained under the new paragraph to
be submitted to the FBI if requested; require that fingerprints
obtained under the new paragraph be removed within ten days of
notification that the individual is no longer employed by or otherwise
affiliated with the requesting entity or when the entity is no longer
participating in the program; and allow the GBI to charge an annual
fee of up to $500 to any non-state entity “that desires to participate in
the [fingerprinting] program.”45
The Committee also added subsections that amended the Georgia
Code to adapt to this new change to the GBI fingerprinting program.
The first of these subsections sought to change Code section
20-1A-31.46 In addition to non-substantive grammatical changes, the
Committee added that the “time frames set forth in this subsection
shall not apply when fingerprints have been retained by the
department due to its participation in the [fingerprinting] program.”47
Similarly, in addition to comparable non-substantive grammatical
changes, this same time frame language was proposed to be added to
Code sections 20-1A-32, 20-1A-38, 20-1A-39, 31-7-258, 49-5-62,
49-5-68, and 49-5-69.1.48
The Committee further changed several Code sections to indicate
that if the relevant department was participating in the fingerprint
program, the GBI and FBI “shall be authorized to retain fingerprints
obtained” under the program “and the department shall notify the
individual whose fingerprints were taken of the parameters of such
retention.”49 This notification language was proposed to be added to
Code sections 20-1A-34, 31-2-9, 35-3-33, 31-7-254, 31-7-259,
37-1-28, 49-2-14, 49-2-14.1, 49-5-62, 49-5-64, 49-5-69.1, and
49-5-111.50
45. Id. § 1A-2, pp. 3–4, ll. 82–101.
46. Id. § 2-1, pp. 4–5, ll. 104–06.
47. Id. § 2-1, pp. 4–5, ll. 144–46.
48. Id. § 2-2, pp. 5–6, ll. 161–66; SB 336 (HCS), § 2-4, pp. 6–7, ll. 197–98, 212–14, 2018 Ga. Gen.
Assemb.; id. § 2-5, pp. 7–8, ll. 216–18, 255–58; id. § 2-9, pp. 10–11, ll. 313–15, 330–32, 358–
61; id. § 2-14, pp. 12–13, ll. 401–03, 426–28; Id. § 2-17, pp. 14, ll. 478–82; id. § 2-18, pp. 15, ll. 484–
86, 491–93.
49. See, e.g., SB 336 (HCS), § 2-3, p. 6, ll. 191–95, 2018 Ga. Gen. Assemb.
50. Id.; id. § 2-6, p. 9, ll. 274–82; id. § 2-7, p. 9, ll. 284–91; id. § 2-8, pp. 9–10, ll. 293–95, 307–
11; id. § 2-10, p. 11, ll. 368–72; SB 336 (HCS), § 2-11, pp. 11–12, ll. 374–81, 2018 Ga. Gen.
Assemb.; id. § 2-12, p. 12, ll. 383–90; id. § 2-13, p. 12, ll. 392–99; id. § 2-14, pp. 12–13, ll. 401–03,
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Finally, the Committee’s revised version amended Code section
49-5-63 to adapt it to the new fingerprinting program, changing the
section to read that any employee other than a director “who receives
a preliminary records check determination that is satisfactory shall
not be required to obtain a fingerprint records check when
fingerprints have been retained by the department due to its
participation in the program.”51
SB 336 was read for the third time in the House on March 19,
2018.52 The House passed the Committee substitute of SB 336 on
March 19, 2018, by a majority vote of 113 to 59.53
The Senate agreed to the House substitute on March 29, 2018, by a
vote of 46 to 0.54 The House then sent the bill to Governor Nathan
Deal (R) on April 5, 2018.55 Governor Deal signed the bill into law
on May 6, 2018, and the bill became effective on July 1, 2018.56
The Act
Part I
Part I of the Act amends Code section 35-3-4.1, relating to
subpoenas to produce electronic communication service records for
computers or electronic devices used in furtherance of certain
offenses against minors, and Code section 35-3-4.3, relating to the
subpoena power for investigations of violations involving trafficking
of persons for labor or sexual servitude.57 The legislature amended
these Code sections to provide greater protection for victims of
sexual abuse by preventing communication carriers from notifying
subscribers suspected of such crimes of subpoenas issued against
them.58 Otherwise, suspects notified of such subpoenas could thwart
422–26; id. § 2-16, p. 14, ll. 459–60, 472–76; id. § 2-18, p. 15, ll. 484–91; SB 336 (HCS), § 2-19, p. 15,
ll. 495–500, 2018 Ga. Gen. Assemb. (referring only to the GBI and not the FBI).
51. Id. § 2-15, p. 14, ll. 452–55.
52. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 336, Mar. 19, 2018.
53. Id.; Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, SB 336, #728 (Mar. 19, 2018).
54. Georgia Senate Voting Record, SB 336, Vote #782 (Mar. 29, 2018).
55. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 336, Apr. 5, 2018.
56. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 35-3-33 (2018).
57. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 1-1, at 508–09.
58. Video Recordings of Senate Meeting at 1 hr., 59 min., 43 sec. (Feb. 28, 2018) (remarks by Sen.
Renee Unterman (R-45th)), https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=10&v=6qxmnnlOFls
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investigators by simply deleting incriminating material from their
computers.59
Section 1-1 adds subsection (a)(3) to Code section 353-4.1,
providing that “[a] provider of electronic communication service or
remote computing service shall not provide notification of the
subpoena issued pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection to the
subscriber or customer of such service.”60 Section 1-2 adds similar
language to Code section 35-3-4.3 as new subsection (b), relabeling
the previous subsection (b) as subsection (c).61
Part IA
Part IA of the Act amends Code section 35-3-33, relating to the
powers and duties of the Georgia Crime Information Center (the
Center).62 The purpose of Part IA is to allow the Center to retain and
submit to the FBI fingerprints for individuals subject to fingerprint
based criminal history checks by either Georgia or federal law for
employment or licensing purposes.63 This practice is known as the
Retained Applicant Fingerprint Background Check program or the
“Rapback” program.64
Section 1A-1 adds subsection (a)(1)(F) to Code section 35-3-33,
creating an additional class of people for which the Center may
obtain and file fingerprints.65 Specifically, the Center may now
collect fingerprints for employees subject to fingerprint background
checks.66 However, the fingerprints collected under the Rapback
program must be retained in a secure location separate from the
[https://perma.cc/P5WW-CVD4].
59. Id.
60. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 1-1, at 508.
61. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 1-2, at 508.
62. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 1A-1, at 508–09.
63. Video Recordings of Non-Civil Judiciary Committee Meeting, at 3 min., 5 sec. (Feb. 26, 2018)
(remarks
by
Rep.
Andrew
Welch
(R-110th)),
https://livestream.com/accounts/
19771755/events/7993559/videos/170754965 [https://perma.cc/B9KN-B8CP].
64. Next
Generation
Identification
(NGI),
FED.
BUREAU
OF
INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/fingerprints-and-other-biometrics/ngi [https://perma.cc/E9MS-XDGD]
(last visited Sept. 17, 2018); Rapback, OHIO DEP’T OF DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES,
http://dodd.ohio.gov/CountyBoards/Resources/Pages/Rapback.aspx
[https://perma.cc/Q2GZ-5GSK]
(last visited September 17, 2018) (providing origin of “Rapback” abbreviation).
65. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 1A-1, at 509.
66. O.C.G.A. § 35-3-33(a)(1)(F) (2018)
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fingerprints collected under the criminal system.67 Further, the Center
may not retain fingerprints submitted for obtaining a weapons carry
license.68
Section 1A-2 adds subsections (a)(18)–(20) to Code section
35-3-33.69 These subsections clarify the Center’s responsibilities in
implementing the Rapback program.70 The Center must now submit
fingerprints collected under the program to the FBI.71 The Center
must also remove a person’s fingerprints collected under the program
within ten days after it receives notice that the person no longer
works for a participating organization, or when an organization
decides to no longer participate in the program.72 The Center must
inform the FBI when it deletes the fingerprints under these
circumstances.73 Finally, the Center may collect an annual subscriber
fee of up to $500.00 for any non-state agency participating in the
program.74
Part II
Although prior versions provided a much more expansive
implementation of the new fingerprint check program, the Act
focuses only on DECAL, DHS, DCH, and DBHDD.75 Section 2 of
the Act amends statutes governing fingerprint background checks for
these agencies. Broadly, the amendments introduce notification and
retention requirements and provide that repeated fingerprint
collections are not necessary for participants in the new fingerprint
collection program.
Section 2-1 amends Code section 20-1A-31, relating to records
check applications for potential employees and fingerprint records
checks.76 First, the Act amends subsection (a) by specifying that the
time frames described in that subsection do not apply when
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
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fingerprints have been retained under the Rapback program.77
Additionally, the Act amends subsection (b) by clarifying that
employees do not need to have their fingerprints checked every five
years if their fingerprints have been retained under the Rapback
program.78 Additionally, the Act includes non-substantive grammar
changes throughout this Code section.79
Section 2-2 amends Code section 20-1A-32, relating to program
license or commission applicants, records check requirements, and
change of ownership.80 The Act adds subsection (d), which specifies
that the time frames described in that Code section do not apply when
fingerprints have been retained under the Rapback program.81
Section 2-3 amends Code section 20-1A-34, relating to fingerprint
checks on the national level, satisfactory determination prior to
employment, and additional records checks.82 The Act amends
subsection (b) by clarifying that employees do not need to have their
fingerprints checked every five years if their fingerprints have been
retained under the Rapback program.83 The Act also adds subsection
(c), which states that the GBI and FBI may retain fingerprints
obtained through the Rapback program if the department is a
participating organization.84 The department must now notify the
person whose fingerprints were taken of the parameters of such
retention.85 Finally, the Act includes non-substantive grammar
changes throughout this Code section.86
Section 2-4 amends Code section 20-1A-38, relating to change of
directors and records check requirements.87 The Act amends
subsection (a) by specifying that the time frames described in
subsection (a) do not apply when fingerprints have been retained

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 511.
Id.
Id. at 510–11.
2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-2, at 511.
Id.
2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-3, at 511–12.
Id. at 512.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 20-1A-34(c) (2018).
2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-3, at 511–12.
2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-4, at 512–13.
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under the Rapback program.88 The Act also includes non-substantive
syntax changes.89
Section 2-5 amends Code section 20-1A-39, relating to potential
employees, current employees and directors, and records check
requirements.90 The Act amends subsection (a) by specifying that the
time frames described in that subsection do not apply when
fingerprints have been retained under the Rapback program.91 The
Act also amends subsection (c) by clarifying that employees do not
need to have their fingerprints checked every five years if their
fingerprints have been retained under the Rapback program.92
Additionally, the Act includes non-substantive grammar changes
throughout this Code section.93
Section 2-6 amends Code section 31-2-9, relating to records check
requirements for certain health care facilities.94 The Act adds
subsection (g), which states that the GBI and FBI may retain
fingerprints obtained through the Rapback program if the department
is a participating organization.95 Subsection (g) also requires the
department to notify the person whose fingerprints were taken of the
parameters of such retention.96
Section 2-7 amends Code section 31-2A-7, relating to “conviction
data,” to authorize departments to receive data from law enforcement
relevant to employment decisions and criminal history information.97
The Act adds subsection (h), which states that the GBI and FBI may
retain fingerprints obtained through the Rapback program if the
department is a participating organization.98 Subsection (h) also
requires the department to notify the person whose fingerprints were
taken of the parameters of such retention.99

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
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Section 2-8 amends Code section 31-7-254, relating to the
transmission of the director’s fingerprints to the Georgia Crime
Information Center for review and notification to the department of
its findings.100 The GBI and FBI may retain fingerprints obtained
through the Rapback program if the department is a participating
organization.101 The department must also notify the person whose
fingerprints were taken of the retention.102
Section 2-9 amends Code section 31-7-258, relating to the change
of facility director, notification to department, and effect of
department determination.103 The Act amends subsections (a) and (c)
by specifying that the time frames described in those subsections do
not apply when fingerprints have been retained under the Rapback
program.104 Additionally, the Act includes non-substantive grammar
changes throughout this Code section.105
Section 2-10 amends Code section 31-7-259, relating to
preliminary records check determinations.106 The GBI and FBI may
retain fingerprints obtained through the Rapback program if the
department is a participating organization.107 The department must
also notify the person whose fingerprints were taken of the
parameters of such retention.108
Section 2-11 amends Code section 37-1-28, relating to conviction
data.109 The Act adds subsection (g), which states that the GBI and
FBI may retain fingerprints obtained through the Rapback program if
the department is a participating organization.110 The department
must also notify the person whose fingerprints were taken of the
parameters of such retention.111
Section 2-12 amends Code section 49-2-14, relating to record
searches for conviction data on prospective employees.112 The Act
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-8, at 515.
O.C.G.A. § 31-7-254 (2018).
Id.
2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-9, at 515–16.
Id.
Id.
2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-10, at 516–17.
O.C.G.A. § 31-7-259(n) (2018).
Id.
2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-11, at 517.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 37-1-28(g) (2018).
2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-12, at 517.
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adds subsection (i), which states that the GBI and FBI may retain
fingerprints obtained through the Rapback program if the department
is a participating organization.113 Subsection (i) also requires the
department to notify the person whose fingerprints were taken of the
parameters of such retention.114
Section 2-13 amends Code section 49-2-14.1, relating to
definitions and records check requirements for licensing certain
facilities.115 The Act adds subsection (g), which states that the GBI
and FBI may retain fingerprints obtained through the Rapback
program if the department is a participating organization.116
Subsection (g) also requires the department to notify the person
whose fingerprints were taken of the parameters of such retention.117
Section 2-14 amends Code section 49-5-62, relating to records
check applications for directors of new facilities and preliminary
records checks for employees.118 The Act adds subsection (b), which
states that the GBI and FBI may retain fingerprints obtained through
the Rapback program if the department is a participating
organization.119 Subsection (b) also requires the department to notify
the person whose fingerprints were taken of the retention.120
Furthermore, subsection (b) specifies that the time frames described
do not apply when fingerprints have been retained under the Rapback
program.121 The Act also includes non-substantive grammar changes
throughout this Code section.122
Section 2-15 amends Code section 49-5-63, relating to notice of
determination, issue of license, and effect of unsatisfactory
determination.123 The amendment specifies that any employee other
than the director who receives a satisfactory records check does not
need to obtain a fingerprint records check if that employee’s
fingerprints have been retained by the department under the Rapback
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
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program.124 The amendment also includes non-substantive grammar
changes throughout this Code section.125
Section 2-16 amends Code section 49-5-64, relating to fingerprint
records checks.126 The Act retains subsection (a) and adds subsection
(b), which states that the GBI and FBI may retain fingerprints
obtained through the Rapback program if the department is a
participating organization.127 Subsection (b) also requires the
department to notify the person whose fingerprints were taken of the
retention.128
Section 2-17 amends Code section 49-5-68, relating to change of
director.129 The Act adds subsection (d), which specifies that the time
frames described in this Code section do not apply when the
fingerprints have been retained under the Rapback program.130
Section 2-18 amends Code section 49-5-69.1, relating to
fingerprint and preliminary records checks for foster homes, notice of
results, violations, and foster parents known to have criminal
records.131 The Act adds subsection (f), which specifies that the time
frames described in this Code section do not apply when fingerprints
have been retained under the Rapback program.132 The GBI and FBI
may retain fingerprints obtained through the Rapback program if the
department is a participating organization.133 Further, the department
must notify the person whose fingerprints were taken of the
parameters of such retention.134
Section 2-19 amends Code section 49-5-111, relating to employers
authorized to make records checks.135 The Act revises subsection (c)
by providing that the GBI and FBI may retain fingerprints obtained
through the Rapback program if the department is a participating

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 519.
Id. at 518–19.
2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-16, at 519.
Id.
Id.
2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 217, at 519.
Id.
2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-18, at 519–20.
Id. at 520.
O.C.G.A. § 49-5-69.1(f) (2018).
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organization.136 The amendment also requires the department to
notify the person whose fingerprints were taken of the retention.137
Analysis
Strengthening Law Enforcement
The original form of SB 336 sought to prohibit Internet providers
from notifying customers of subpoenas against them. Such a
prohibition allows law enforcement to access the data authorized
under the subpoena before the user would have a chance to know of
the subpoena. Prior to the passage of SB 336, an Internet service
provider was able to, at its discretion, inform customers of a
subpoena against them, although law enforcement could urge the
service provider not to do so.138 If informed of a subpoena against
them, the customers could have erased, removed, or otherwise
destroyed the data sought by law enforcement in an effort to escape
conviction.139 As the law stands today, these customers will not know
of the subpoena seeking their data before law enforcement has the
chance to act on it. Fundamentally, such a law strengthens law
enforcement’s power at the expense of suspects having knowledge of
subpoenas against them.
The law is a reflection of a government seeking to shore up the
power of law enforcement against a rising wave of technology that is
increasingly more difficult to track. Georgia is certainly not the first
state to pass such a law; many states have taken this step or similar
ones in recent years, including Florida, Vermont, Illinois, and West
Virginia.140 Federal law enforcement is also struggling with how to
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Levenson, supra note 18.
139. See, e.g., Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Davis, No. 05-0316, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50955, at *4–
5 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2006).
140. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.24 (West 2018) (requiring Internet provider in certain circumstances to
create backup copy of communications “[w]ithout notifying the subscriber”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/115-17b (West 2018) (allowing court to prohibit disclosure of subpoena for up to ninety days in
certain circumstances); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 8103 (West 2018) (permitting delay of up to ninety
days of required customer notification in “emergency” circumstances); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1G2(e) (West 2018) (“The electronic communications system or service . . . shall not disclose the existence
of the subpoena or its response to the subpoena to the account holder identified in the subpoena.”).
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handle increasingly elusive data and tech companies, which will
cooperate with law enforcement only if legally compelled to do so.141
Thus, the introduction of SB 336 exemplifies Georgia’s interest in
supporting law enforcement against new technology by choosing to
give law enforcement more tools to fight against disappearing data.
However, SB 336, in its final form, was more than just an attempt
to stop Internet service providers from informing their customers of
subpoenas against them. SB 336 went through substantial changes in
the House, where the Judiciary Non-Civil Committee added the
substance of HB 623, then pending in the House, to SB 336 by
Committee substitute.142 These changes sought to allow the Georgia
Crime Information Center to retain fingerprints of individuals who
were going through background checks for an employer or agency
who participated in the GBI’s fingerprinting program.
SB 336, before passage, became a bipartite bill; it would prohibit
Internet service providers from notifying customers of subpoenas
against them and would also give the Georgia Crime Information
Center more power by allowing it to retain certain individuals’
fingerprints. Both portions of SB 336 thus serve to increase the
power of law enforcement, reflecting a commitment by the Georgia
legislature to better equip state law enforcement.

141. Most technology companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley, now publicly state their
disinclination to cooperate with federal prosecutors unless faced with a court order compelling them to
do so. See, e.g., GUIDELINES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES, TWITTER, INC. (2017) (“Nonpublic information about Twitter users will not be released to law enforcement except in response to
appropriate legal process such as a subpoena, court order, or other valid legal process.”); LEGAL
PROCESS
FOR
USER
DATA
REQUESTS
FAQ,
GOOGLE,
INC.
(2018),
https://support.google.com/transparencyreport/answer/7381738 [https://perma.cc/9UVQ-X3ER] (last
visited Oct. 25, 2018) (“When we receive such a request, our team reviews the request to make sure it
satisfies legal requirements and Google’s policies. Generally speaking, for us to produce any data, the
request must be made in writing, signed by an authorized official of the requesting agency and issued
under an appropriate law. If we believe a request is overly broad, we’ll seek to narrow it.”); LEGAL
PROCESS GUIDELINES FOR GOVERNMENT AND LAW ENFORCEMENT WITHIN THE UNITED STATES,
APPLE, INC. (2017) (“For all requests from government and law enforcement agencies within the United
States . . . Apple will only provide content in response to a search warrant issued upon a showing of
probable cause . . . . In instances where Apple determines that there is no valid legal basis or where a
request is considered to be unclear, inappropriate or over-broad Apple will challenge or reject the
request.”).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 39–51.
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Constitutional Concerns
Rather than challenge the government’s attempts to access
customer data simply out of spite, technology companies like
Microsoft have challenged such attempts on constitutional
grounds.143 Because federal law allows for virtually unlimited ninety
day extensions at the discretion of the court, Microsoft, along with
other technology companies, has argued that the absence of any set
timeframe for holding customer data without informing the customer
impedes Microsoft’s ability to exercise its free speech right to inform
its customers of actions affecting their private data, meaning the
government is violating the First Amendment of the Constitution.144
Further, Microsoft argues that because customers have no awareness
of the request for their data, it can bring a challenge under the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution.145 Microsoft has argued that such
constitutional violations erode customer trust in Microsoft’s services,
making it sufficient to allow Microsoft to bring a claim on the
customer’s behalf.146 Some technology companies that have used this
constitutional argument have found their cases dismissed on
procedural grounds.147
Although a technology company has not yet directly challenged
Georgia’s law, it stands to be contested on the same grounds as
previous challenges to the federal Electronic Communications
Privacy Act. Such a challenge could harm how Georgia is viewed by
technology companies seeking to operate within its borders. This
concern is especially relevant in light of the legislature’s recent
public attempts to cater to technology companies.148 To avoid such
143. See Joel Margolis, Should a Service Provider Notify Customers When They Are Subject to Law
Enforcement Investigations?, SUBSENTIO (2018), http://www.subsentio.com/service-provider-notifycustomers-subject-law-enforcement-investigations/ [https://perma.cc/YX2H-4P7W].
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
This legal framework [holding that service providers cannot bring claims on behalf
of their subscribers] was upheld in two recent cases involving LEA demands on
Internet providers for subscriber information. One case in 2012 dismissed a Fourth
Amendment motion by Twitter; the other denied a similar claim in 2015 by
Facebook.
Id.
148. See, e.g., Richard Elliot, State Leaders Update Amazon on Transit Expansion with Hopes to Win
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challenges, Georgia could consider limiting the timeframe that law
enforcement is allowed to access consumer data without notification,
instead of maintaining the currently open-ended language of the
statute.
Richard J. Uberto Jr. & Brooke Wilner

HQ2, WSB-TV2 (June 19, 2018, 8:13 PM), https://www.wsbtv.com/news/local/atlanta-leaders-hopenew-transit-changes-will-help-bring-amazon-hq2-to-the-city/773004394
[https://perma.cc/8FD3LXFK].
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